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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FREEDOM OF INFORmATION Acr

-INVESTIGATORY

FILES

Frankel v. Securities Exchange Commission
Concern

over

the inaccessibility

of governmental

agencies'

prompted Congress to amend the Administrative Procedure Act 2 by
adding the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)8 to it in 1966. Despite
1 An effect of the growth in the number and size of governmental agencies has been
the erection of a "paper curtain" of bureaucracy. The primary justification for agency nondisclosure of information is derived from the doctrine of executive privilege. In United
States v. Reynolds, 845 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court acknowledged the existence of executive
privilege as inherent in the separation of powers. "The court itself must determine
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect." Id. at 8.
Thus, in order to resolve a particular controversy where the doctrine of executive privilege
is raised, a court must analyze the interest at stake in light of the separation of powers
and the checks and balances designed to safeguard that separation.
However, executive privilege is not a shield which is automatically activated when
the public approaches the government for information. The courts have recognized that
such an interpretation of the doctrine could circumvent the judiciary's check on the executive branch and, as a result, have held that the executive privilege must be pleaded and
will not be implied. In General Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 879 (9th
Cir. 1969), the court enjoined the Internal Revenue Service from withholding records concerning a business transaction. The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the Service's claim of executive privilege, held that the privilege may not be invoked by inference alone but must be
raised specifically. In Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court of
appeals remanded a case to determine whether the Garwin Report (report on the SST
compiled at Presidential request) was within the statutory exemptions of the Freedom of
Information Act. The court refused to consider the doctrine of executive privilege as a
defense because it had not been expressly invoked by the government. Id. at 1071. Therefore, the doctrine of executive privilege is subject to certain limitations: it must be expressly pleaded as a defense by the executive branch and the guidelines for its operation
are determined by the judiciary.
Occasionally, the doctrine of executive privilege also proves to be a barrier when Congress seeks to enforce its right to be privy to important information. See Berger, Executive
Privilege v. CongressionalInquiry, 12 U.C.LA. L. Rv. 1943 (1965).
2 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (1970), was designed,
at least in part, to provide the public with information about government activities. By its
terms, only persons "properly and directly concerned" could obtain access to agency fliles.
The right to information was further qualified by provisions stating that an agency could
withhold documents from even this limited group "in the public interest" or whenever
"good cause [for confidentiality]" was shown. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 824,
60 Stat. § 3. This vague language made the APA susceptible to agency manipulation and
severely hampered the ability of interested persons to get information. The effectiveness
of the APA was further limited by the lack of judicial review of an agency refusal to disclose information, making the agency decision as to the propriety of disclosing information
final. The combined effect of these factors was to render the APA ineffective as a means
to secure information from agencies.
8 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). This Act requires the disclosure of "identifiable" government
records to "any persons" except as "specifically stated in nine exceptions." It eliminates the
APA restriction that only those "properly and directly concerned" are entitled to information. See note 2 supra. Also, the FOIA reverses the APA by placing the burden of
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4 the FOIA has been
its simple phraseology, or perhaps because of it,
the subject of varying interpretations.5 In Frankel v. Securities Exchange Commission,6 the Second Circuit has adopted a restrictive interpretation of the FOIA.
The specific issue in Frankel was whether the exemption for investigatory files7 should apply when investigation and enforcement
justifying non-disclosure on the agency rather than requiring the citizen to show a need
for disclosure. See Note, Recent Statute -Administrative Agencies, 80 HAnv. L. Rav. 909,
910 (1967), where it is stated that the FOIA creates a presumption of disclosure.
4 The dissent in Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972), blames the failure of the

FOIA on equivocal draftsmanship. Id. at 820 n.5. When the FOIA was passed, Professor
Kenneth Davis expressed the opinion that the language in the Act was faulty. Davis, The
Information Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. Cm. L. Ray. 761, 800 (1967) [hereinafter
Davis].
The exemption for investigatory files (see note 7 infra) was criticized by the Second
Circuit in La Morte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971), where Chief Judge Friendly
characterized it as "rather murky." Id. at 451 n.3.
5 Compare the Senate Report on the Act, S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) with the House Report, H. R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) and
Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative
Procedure Act (1967).
In general, the Senate Report complies with the intent of the drafters of the Act to
a greater degree than either the House or the Attorney General's report, both of which tend
toward a restrictive interpretation. This difference between the Senate and the House and
Attorney General's Reports has been judicially noted. In Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 415 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1969), Chief Judge Lindberg wrote:
[T]he House Report accompanied the bill on its passage through the House of
Representatives, after the bill had already passed the Senate.... Mo the extent
that the two reports disagree, the sure indication of Congressional intent is to be
found in the Senate Report which was available for consideration in both houses.
Id. at 595. See also Consumer Union of United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Administration,
801 F. Supp. 796, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1863 (2d Cir.
1971).
6460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S.CT. 125 (1972).
75 U.S.C. § 552(b)7. The FOIA exempts from disclosure "investigatory files compiled

for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than
an agency." This exemption was included to prevent premature access to government
records (thereby revealing litigation strategy), and to protect the informer's privilege.
It is interesting to note the discrepancy between the Senate and House reports as to
the scope of this exemption. According to the Senate, Exemption 7 applies to those ". . . files
prepared .. .to prosecute law violators." (S. RE.P. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)).
A reasonable interpretation of this report is that the exemption applies only to judicial
proceedings, i.e., criminal proceedings. In contrast, the House expands Exemption 7 to
include those ". . . fies related to enforcement of all kinds of laws, labor and securities
laws, [including] adjudicative proceedings." (H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1966)). See note 5, supra.
The significance of this discrepancy should not be understated because it has a direct
bearing on the question of whether an agency may claim that a file is privileged under
Exemption 7. The interpretation adopted by the House is more inclusive and will allow
a greater amount of material to escape disclosure while the Senate version will allow only
a limited class of investigatory files to be so protected.
The majority in Frankel fails to recognize the existence of any discrepancy between
the Senate and House reports as to the scope of Exemption 7. Id. at 817. Inasmuch as the
purpose of the FOIA amendment is to promote disclosure (see note 3 supra), the exemptions should be narrowly construed. See Nader, The Freedom From Information: The Act
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proceedings have terminated.8 The plaintiffs were stockholders pursuing
a class action for damages against the officers of Occidental Petroleum
Corporation for violating the securities laws. In order to obtain "documentary support" for the allegations of their complaint, they requested
to be permitted to inspect the files which the SEC had compiled in-an
earlier prosecution of Occidental Petroleum for securities violations.9
A divided court reversed the district court's decision enjoining the
SEC from withholding these documents and ruled that the files were
and the Agencies, 5

HARV.

Civ. RlGoHs-Civ. LB. L. Rv.1 (1970), where Mr. Nader argues

that the exemptions were intended to provide objective guidelines for the courts to use in
reviewing the validity of agency denials and must, necessarily, be narrowly construed.
In Consumer Union of United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F. Supp.
796, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1863 (2d Cir. 1971) the district
court, by way of dictum, said that the exemptions should be construed with disclosure as
the "guiding star." The failure of the Second Circuit, in Frankel, to discern the discrepancy between the Senate and House reports and its unwillingness to adopt a narrow
construction reflects a lack of judicial sensitivity to the basic problem.
8 This question was considered by the draftsmen of the FOIA. The initial version of
the FOIA provided that the exemption for investigatory files was limited by the provision
that they would be privileged ". .. until they were [used] and/or effect[ed] an action or
proceeding or a private party's effective participation therein." S. REP. No. 1666, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The position of the agencies was that such a provision would
hinder investigatory procedures and the agencies might be ordered to disclose a file containing a collateral aspect not yet concluded. This provision was subsequently deleted.
See note 7 supra.
Those who favored the disclosure of investigatory files upon termination of the investigation and enforcement proceedings argued that the agencies should not be permitted
to rely on the initial classification of a file to authorize the unwarranted withholding of
information ad infinitum. The controversy is one of considerable import and has resulted
in a conflict among circuits and district courts. The Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia and a district court in the Third Circuit have adopted the position that an
agency must disclose its fies upon termination of enforcement proceedings. In Bristol
Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400

US. 824 (1970), the court remanded the action to the district court to determine whether
there was a realisticprospect of continued enforcement proceedings. "Ain agency cannot,
consistent with the broad disclosure mandate of the Act, protect all its files with the label

'investigatory' and a suggestion that enforcement proceedings may be launched at some
unspecified future date." Id. at 939. A similar conclusion was reached in Cooney v. Sun

Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968), where the court held that
the exemption for investigatory files applied to files relating to a contemplated lawsuit
or enforcement proceedings. See also Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEx. L Rav. 1261 (1970). "Once litigation is
concluded, disclosure is impliedly required." Id. at 1279.
Prior to the decision of the Second Circuit in Frankel,no federal court of appeals had
ruled that the exemption for investigatory files would apply despite termination of enforcement proceedings. The only decision favoring that position was Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971), where the court held that,
so long as a file is compiled for enforcement purposes, it need not be produced when law
enforcement ceases. The Frankel decision provides that the exemption for investigatory
files continues after termination of enforcement proceedings and is in opposition to the
D.C. Circuit's position as enunciated in Bristol Myers, supra. Certiorari was applied for in
Frankel but was denied, 93 S.Cr. 125 (1972).

9SEC v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. No. 71-0520 (S.D.N.Y., terminated on the basis
of consent decree, March 5, 1971).
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exempt from disclosure by virtue of their classification as investigatory
files.
In reaching its decision, the majority relied on two cases decided
under the Act 0 and on its reading of the primary purpose of the FOIA
and the scope of the exemption for investigatory files. The court stated
that disclosure of the files would seriously hamper future investigations 1 while it would not promote the ultimate goal of the Act which,
the court contends, is to enable the public to secure information in
order to make informed decisions through the electoral process as to
the nature, scope and procedure of federal government activities.12
The court's view of the FOIA's purpose is contrary to that expressed
by Chief Judge Friendly in LaMorte v. Mansfield'3 as well as to the
10 The two cases relied on by the majority are unconvincing as supportive material.
The first, NLRB v. Clement Bros. Co., 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969), upheld a refusal to
disclose statements of nonwitnesses in a pre-trial hearing on unfair labor practices because
the information was sensitive in light of the employer-employee relationship. The other
case cited was Evans v. Dep't of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 918 (1972), in which the court upheld a refusal to disclose a letter sent to
the Federal Aviation Agency regarding the competence of the plaintiff pilot. The court
held that the public interest in assuring confidentiality of those seeking to call potentially
important facts to the attention of the appropriate agency greatly outweighed the individual's need to know.
Both of these cases are extremely weak authority for the proposition that Exemption
7 does not end upon termination of the enforcement proceeding. The decision in Clement
Bros. was made in order to protect employees who have testified against their employer
regarding unfair labor practices. Clearly, an employer should not be entitled to testimony
given by an employee to an agency because of the sensitivity of the employer-employee
relationship and the inhibiting effect on the testimony of future witnesses. The Evans case
relies on the same rationale since the FAA depends upon informants to trigger its investigations and no purpose would be served by disclosing the name of the informant. In
Frankel, the agency did not establish a sensitive relationship nor did it show that no
purpose would be served by disclosure. On the contrary, any contention of a sensitive relationship in Frankel would seem to be precluded by the decision of the Second Circuit in
La Morte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971), where the court required that nonpublic testimony given to the SEC be disclosed to the stockholders in a derivative action.
In addition, the plaintiff in Frankel seeks disclosure not for personal reprisal as was the
case in Clement Bros. and Evans but rather to collect damages for securities law violations.
The inadequacy of the cases relied on by the majority is matched by the opinion's
failure to cite cases which deal with the issue at bar. The court does not attempt to distinguish Bristol Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(see note 8 supra), which is in conflict with the Frankel decision, nor does the court mention Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Dept't of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(see note 8 supra), which is in direct support with its position.
11 That the government has a privilege not to disclose the identity of informers in
certain situations is generally accepted. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957),
Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). However, in the
instant case, the court expands that privilege, without explanation, to include the protection of the agency's investigatory techniques.
12460 F.2d 818, 816 (2d Cir. 1972).
13 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971). "RIhe objective of the Information Act was to promote
general access to agency records." Id. at 451.

1972]

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE

opinions of the Fourth 14 and D.C. Circuits. 15 Relying on this questionable interpretation, the court denied relief and limited the plaintiff to
ordinary discovery procedures. 6
The dissenting opinion of Judge Oakes emphasized two important
considerations. First, he rejected the majority view of the ultimate
purpose of the Act and argued that the aim of the FOIA is to empower
the federal courts 7 to subject agency operations to public perusal. In
addition, Judge Oakes stressed that the district court had sufficiently
14 In Weilford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971) the court said that the FOIA
was designed "...
to guarantee the public's right to know how the government is discharging its duty to protect the public interest." Id. at 24.
15American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1969). "The
premier purpose of the act was to elucidate the availability of governmental records and
actions to the American citizen." See also Nader, Freedom From Information: The Act
and the Agencies, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 1 (1970). According to Ralph
Nader, the ultimate goal of the FOIA is substantial administrative reform achieved
through public awareness of administrative failing.
16By virtue of the decision, the litigants are precluded from using the FOIA as a
vehicle to secure documentation for their claim and must, therefore, satisfy the requirements for discovery set down in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FED. R. Civ. P.
26-37). Although the federal discovery procedures are liberal, they do not match the all
inclusive language of the FOIA and represent a more difficult path for the litigants to
follow. "In the discovery procedure a district court judge will be able to balance the need
for the documents with the need for confidentiality." 460 F.2d at 818. See generally note
23 infra.
17 By providing district courts with the power to enjoin an agency from withholding
records, the FOIA represents a substantial improvement over the APA which was lacking
in provisions for judicial review. See note 2 supra. However, this provision in the FOIA
is not a panacea because it lacks a mandatory provision for judicial enforcement. Since the
relief sought is equitable, the petition may be subject to the court's intrinsic power to
refuse to participate. A problem also arises as to the extent to which a court may exercise
its equitable discretion. Where the information sought to be disclosed does not fall within
the enumerated exemptions of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), there is a question as
to whether a court may withhold non-exempt material when it deems such to be in the
public interest. In Consumer Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Administration
301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971)
the court held that it must "according to traditional equity principles, weigh the effects
of disclosure and non-disclosure and determine the best course to follow ...." Id. at 806.
However, the Fourth and D.C. Circuits have expressly rejected the contention that
the courts have any such equitable discretion. In Welford v. Hardin, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077
(D.C. Cir. 1971), and Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the courts held
that the district court has no equitable jurisdiction to deny disclosure on grounds other
than those "specifically stated" in the FOIA.
In General Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969), the Ninth
Circuit, in discussing the exemption of internal agency memoranda, stated:
In exercising the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Freedom of Information Act,
the court must weigh the effects of disclosure and nondisclosure, according to
traditional equity principles and determine the best course to follow in the given
circumstances. The effect on the public is the primary consideration.
415 F.2d at 880.
However, Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970) suggests that the broad
language of Benson was not meant to apply to other than the enumerated exemptions.
Id. at 933.
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narrowed the scope of its order and accompanying memorandum 8 by
providing for in camera production of the records.1 9 By virtue of in
camera examination, the agency's procedures and informants would
be amply safeguarded, thereby rendering the majority's fear of exposure groundless. Although Judge Oakes acknowledged that on such a
question reasonable judges may differ, he bolstered his position by
citing numerous cases in which governmental agencies have been required to produce documentary material obtained in the course of
investigation.2o
Contrary to the analysis of the court in Frankel, the provisions of
the FOIA were deliberately couched in broad terms, reflecting the
paramount intention that the Act be a disclosurerather than a withholding statute.21 The key issue underlying all the cases under FOIA is a
determination of the ultimate goal Congress sought to attain. The
majority in Frankel relies on a loose reading of the House report but
that report is not itself representative of the Act's purpose. 22
Frankel is, in effect, a retreat from the liberal position adopted
last term in La Morte.23 The Second Circuit had, in that case, set forth
a policy advocating the free flow of information. By adopting this re18 Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 20, 1971 [mem.]; Nov. 5, 1971
[order]).
19 This is a procedure whereby the records requested are disclosed before the judge
in the privacy of his chambers. Attorneys for either or both parties may be present at this
time depending upon the sensitivity of the material being disclosed. After reviewing the
records the judge may require that suitable deletions be made by the agency in order to
protect exempt information. The remaining portion of these records would be disclosed
to the petitioner. The rationale for this procedure is that, while a portion of the records is
exempt from disclosure, there should not be a blanket protection for the entire file. Such
in camera examinations were mandated in Gruman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v.
Renegotiation Board, 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and Bristol Myers Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
20 460 F.2d at 820. Although this list of cases provides a valuable insight into the
extent of court and agency interaction, none of them deals with Exemption 7 of the FOIA.
21 See note 3 supra.
22 There are several reasons supporting the view that the Senate Report reflects the
better interpretation of the FOIA. In the first place, the Senate Report was the only report
to accompany the FOIA through both the Senate and the House. Secondly, the history
of the legislation in this area lends additional support to the proposition that the Senate
Report is more representative of Congressional intent. The FOIA's predecessor, the APA,
was considered ineffective in combating the growing "paper curtain" of governmental
bureaucracy. See note 2 supra. In light of the abuses it was designed to rectify (see note 3
supra) it would be incongruous to espouse a restrictive interpretation of the FOIA. Since
the Senate Report adopts an approach which favors disclosure, it more accurately represents
the intent of Congress.
23 The court there held that a party who testified in a non-public investigation conducted by the SEC and who received a copy of the transcript of his testimony was required
to furnish copies thereof to his adversaries in a stockholder's action. The effect of this
ruling was to severely limit the privilege of confidentiality of administrative investigations.
See Second Circuit Note, 46 ST. JonN L. REv. 418 (1972).
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strictive approach, the Second Circuit has diluted the provisions of the
FOIA and may have so severely blunted the thrust of the entire Act as
to prevent its use as a weapon in the fight against the "curse of bigness"
in governmental agencies.
PRE-I'DucrrIoN REVIEW

Naskiewicz v. Lawyer
When a potential Army inductee objects to his draft board's decision to deny him a deferment, he usually finds that immediate recourse to the courts is not available. As a general rule, Congress has
prohibited pre-induction judicial review of Selective Service orders.24
However, in Naskiewicz v. Lawyer,25 the Second Circuit held that,
where a registrant has been denied the benefits of Selective Service
regulations enacted for his benefit, a district court has jurisdiction to
20
review.
The petitioner had been given an ophthamological examination
at the Cleveland office of the Armed Forces Entrance Examining Station (AFEES) and was found unfit for military service after originally
24 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1970) reads:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any
registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to
a criminal prosecution....
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, the draft law contained no specific provision
pertaining to judicial review of Selective Service board decisions. However, the Supreme
Court, in two important cases, considered this problem. In Falbo v. United States, 320
US. 549 (1944), an appeal of a criminal prosecution of a Jehovah's Witness who had
refused to report for the mandatory civilian work alternative to military service, the Court
refused to review the local board's decision on the grounds that the applicant had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946),
where the problem of exhaustion of remedies did not exist, the Court ruled that, in the
event of a criminal prosecution, it will have jurisdiction to review a decision of a draft
board. Id. at 123. The Court, in defining the scope of its jurisdiction to review in such
proceedings, stated that "[t]he question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only
if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant." Id. at 122-23.
See also Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54
CAzIF. L. Rav. 2123 (1966).
It was the Second Circuit's decision in Wolf v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16,
372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967) that aroused Congress to enact § 460(b)(3). See Oestereich v.
Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 US. 233, 244 n.7 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Wolf, which involved registrants who were reclassified I-A as a result of
their participation in an anti-Vietnam war rally, the court of appeals ruled that the
restrictions on judicial review of a board's decision did not apply when first amendment
rights were involved. In order to prevent such an expansion of the judiciary's power to
review Selective Service Board opinions, which power was felt to cause unnecessary and
costly delays to the induction system (113 Cong. Rec. 15, 426 (1967) Conf. Rep. No. 346
(June 18, 1967) 1 US.C.CA.N. 1360 (1967)), Congress moved to restore the stricter "criminal
prosecution" principle resulting in § 460(b)(3).
25456 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1972).
26Id. at 1168. The district court had dismissed the appellant's action on the ground
that it lacked jurisdiction.

